The allocation of resources within a firm is one of the most important decisions made by its management and the allocation of funds is organized in so-called internal capital markets. We empirically investigate to what extent firms' resource allocation decisions are affected by the CEOs' response to division-managers' rent-seeking activities and whether equity incentives throughout the firm, i.e., Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs), can mitigate this problem. We argue that the CEO is herself an agent and prefers to use the capital budget as a substitute for increased take-home pay to compensate the division manager for his influence activities. Consistent with this argument, we empirically find that excess capital allocation is negatively associated with division-managers' take-home pay. We further argue and find that equity incentives throughout the firm alleviate this problem by increasing the quality of internal capital allocation.
Introduction
The allocation of resources within a firm is one of the most important decisions made by its management. Examples of such decisions are the allocation of funds for capital expenditures and R&D expenditures at the divisional level. These allocations are organized in so-called internal capital markets; individual divisions of a firm generate cash, which is transferred to the firm' s headquarters, who then decides if and how to allocate the funds back to individual divisions.
1 An important question with respect to internal capital markets is how resource allocation decisions that are taken internally differ from those taken in a marketplace. Both Alchian (1969) and Williamson (1975) indicate that the benefit of allocating capital internally is that investment projects are less troubled by information and incentive problems than would be the case with external financing. The main reason for this is that a firm' s headquarters does a better job of monitoring and information production, which is driven by headquarters having all the ' control rights' (Stein (1997) ). The literature on the diversification discount, however, critically questions the efficiency of internal capital markets. In this paper, we empirically examine to what extent potential inefficiencies are driven by the CEO misusing the capital budget to respond to divisionmanagers' rent-seeking activities and whether equity incentives alleviate this behavior.
Economic theory states that, for the allocation of capital to be efficient, the marginal return to investment should be equal across every investment project. However, efficient capital allocation gets undermined as soon as there are information asymmetry and agency problems. For example, investors in the external capital market are aware of the informational advantages and divergent preferences of CEOs, which leads to more costly financing and thus reduced efficiency.
Similarly, division managers in an internal capital market have better information about divisional prospects and have preferences that do not necessarily coincide with those of the firm.
retention effects, they make it more costly for the division manager to " threaten to leave" .
Unproductive efforts, such as rent-seeking, thus become less attractive, which decreases the need for the CEO to respond and distort the capital budget. Consequentially, we expect firm-wide equity incentives to increase the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation.
To test our expectations, we use segment data from the COMPUSTAT segment filings, compensation data from EXECUCOMP, and hand collected data on Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) from 10-K forms, all over the time period 1998-2004. We choose fiscal year 1998
as the starting point of our sample period because this is the first fiscal year in which FASB (FASB (1997) ). SFAS 131 requires firms to report disaggregated information in a way consistent with the way management internally evaluates the performance of individual operating segments, which allows users to make the same assessments. Previous research shows that SFAS 131 has led to a significant improvement in the information environment (e.g., Berger and Hann (2003) ) and we exploit this improvement in our sample selection.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we estimate a benchmark model of within-firm capital allocation in which the allocation of capital to division i in year t is based on the division' s relative size, profitability, and growth opportunities in year t-1. We extract the division-year specific residual from this model to proxy for a division' s excess capital allocation; then take the firm-year specific variance of the residuals to proxy for the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation. Second, we validate the benchmark model by showing that the proxy for the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation is positively associated with a firm-level proxy of ex-post internal capital market efficiency. Third, we show that, at the divisional level, excess capital allocations are negatively associated with division managers' total pay, after controlling for standard economic determinants of total pay. We interpret this finding as evidence of the CEO using the capital budget as a substitute for increased take-home pay to compensate rent-seeking divisional managers, which is consistent with our expectations. Fourth, we show that, at the firm level, the incentives provided by ESOPs are positively associated with the quality of i n tern al capi tal all ocati on , al so con si sten t wi th our ex pectati on s. Fi nally , we re-run our analyses using numerous alternative specifications and also test the robustness of our results to sample selection problems and endogeneity concerns. We find that our results are robust to all these tests.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence that inefficiencies in internal capital markets are, at least in part, driven by a two-layer agency problem (cf. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) ). We find that, on average, CEOs distort internal capital allocation by using the capital budget as a substitute for increased take-home pay to adjust the overall compensation package of rent-seeking divisional managers. Second, we show that the design of incentive systems can mitigate the problem of misallocation. Although Wulf (2002) finds results consistent with firms designing firm-level incentives in an attempt to reduce i n f l u e n c e a c t i v i ti e s , s h e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t h e r r e s u l t s a r e a l s o c o n s i s t e n t w i th a r g u m e n t s unrelated to issues of rent-seeking in internal capital markets. We contribute to the literature by empirically making an explicit link between the use of employee stock option incentives and the quality of internal capital allocations and show that ESOPs are used to align the interests of employees with those of the firm. Third, while the informativeness principle has been used to predict that firm-level incentives for divisional managers are less useful when there are few operational interdependencies between divisions (e.g., Bushman et al. (1995) ), we show that these incentives can actually be beneficial in these settings once investment decisions and issues of rent-seeking are taken into account. Finally, we add to the literature on whether stock options for employees other than the top executives have incentive effects. While Oyer and Schaeffer (2005) reject the incentive purpose of employee stock options in favor of the retention purpose, Gerakos et al. (2007) find that broad-based equity plans are used by firms whose compensation objective is incentives. Whatever the intended purpose, our model predicts that " on the job behavior" will be affected by these plans, either directly (incentives) or indirectly (retention), and consistent with this we provide empirical evidence that employee stock options increase the quality of an internal capital market.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop our theory and derive hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our research method, and in section 4, we describe the results of our empirical models. We discuss the results and conclude this study in section 5.
Model and Hypotheses

Internal Capital Markets
Building on Grossman and Hart (1986) , Stein (1997) shows that internal capital markets can be superior to external capital markets and centralized financing (bank lending). In contrast to a bank or an external shareholder, the CEO has all the control rights and thus the rights to decide o n h o w t o a l l o c a t e c a p i t a l i n t e r n a l l y . T h e s e c o n t r o l r i g h t s , w h i c h a r e a b s e n t i n e x t e r n a l (centralized) financing, provide the CEO with greater incentives to monitor and engage in a process called " winner-picking" . That is, the CEO can actively shift capital from one division to another based on the expected returns of the divisions. The internal capital market can be more efficient than the external capital market because of this reallocative power of the CEO.
Despite the benefits of internal capital markets versus external capital markets, there is a huge debate in both the academic and more practice-oriented literature about the value of diversified firms (e.g., Villalonga (2004) , Lins and Servaes (1999) , Rajan et al. (2000) , Stowe and Xing (2006) ). Several studies have investigated the use and effects of diversification of a firm and in particular on comparing stand-alone (non-diversified) firms to diversified firms. Studies by, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , and Servaes (1996) find that diversified firms trade at a discount relative to non-diversified firms, while Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) find differences between the Q-sensitivity of investment of stand-alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerates. Although recent studies claim that this diversification discount is the result of measurement error and biased samples (e.g., Whited (2001 ), Villalonga (2004 ), a more fundamental question is why internal capital markets would be inefficient.
The main reason why an internal capital market might be inefficient is related to the same reason why i t might be efficient, i .e., the reallocative power of the CEO. The CEO of a diversified firm might do a poor job in allocating the funds that are generated by some divisions. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that such inefficiencies are driven by a two-layer agency problem where the CEO might misuse the capital budget to compensate a division manager for his rent-seeking activities. To explain the argument more fully, we borrow their model and use it to develop a number of cross-sectional empirical implications.
The Scharfstein and Stein (2000) Model Revisited
The model is a two-period model with periods labeled 1 and 2. At time 1, the CEO of a two-division firm hires two new managers, each of whom manages the assets in place of one division. The division manager can spend time on productive effort i e and/or on non-productive, 
The private benefits at time 2 for the division manager remain γ times the output of his own division and that of the CEO φ times the output of each division. It is assumed that the CEO has all the bargaining power at time 2 and that she is always better off retaining the division manager (formally, )
Before examining the impact of rent-seeking on the allocation of capital, it is important to first examine what happens in a first-best scenario. The first-best allocation of capital (
labeled " efficient allocation" , is achieved when the marginal return to investment is equal across every investment project, which in this case implies 2 The replacement costs are caused by, for example, valuable acquired firm-specific capital leaving the firm.
Based on this characterization of efficient capital allocation and the set-up described above, we can now analyze when rent-seeking occurs and what impact it has on the efficiency of capital allocation. In particular, the above implies that a division manager rent-seeks if
That is, any benefits from a rise in outside options due to rent-seeking must be higher than the private benefits received from an efficient allocation of capital plus the cost of rent-seeking. 3 The rent-seeking condition thus shows that, even though all division managers have the opportunity to rent-seek, not all of them will do so because some are so productive that they incur too much cost from directing time away from productive effort and/or derive sufficient utility from the efficient allocation of capital at time 2.
If the rent-seeking condition holds, then the equilibrium amount of rent-seeking is given
If the rent-seeking condition does not hold, then the division manager does not rent-seek at all. In summary form, the equilibrium level of rent-seeking is thus given by
To determine the optimal wage and allocation of capital, we maximize the CEO' s utility over i I and i w , subject to the division managers' retention constraints. That is, 3 Alternatively, any net benefits of rent-seeking should be higher than the private benefits associated with the efficient allocation of capital, i.e., 
We solve this model for the setting that best reflects the essence of the story, which is a setting where the manager of division 1 always rent-seeks, while the manager of division 2 never rentseeks even though he knows that the manager of division 1 will. 4 The relevant first-order conditions of the Lagrangian in this setting are:
where 1 λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the retention constraint of division manager 1. 5 Equation (9) shows that there will always be some distortion in the optimal allocation of capital. Given that Even though there will always be some misallocation, the extent of misallocation depends on how much the CEO prefers to use the fixed capital budget as opposed to wages to compensate the rent-seeking division manager. Specifically, it depends on whether the marginal cost of 4 Technically, we assume
The Lagrange multiplier for the retention constraint of division manager 2, 2 λ , equals 0, since it is never binding. 6 Remember that the efficient allocation of capital requires that ) ( ) ( 
Assume that there is a capital allocation 
Empirical Implications
The above analysis indicates two mutually exclusive solutions to the CEO' s problem.
Assuming that these two solutions are both observed in a cross-section, as well as variation in the e x te n t of th e p r ob l em p e r s e , th en th e m od el h a s th e f ol l owi n g c r os s -s e c ti on al em pi ri c al implications, where we use subscript i for the division and j for the firm: 
, where
The first two implications lead to the following two hypotheses, respectively:
H1: Ceteris paribus, the extent of overallocation at the divisional level ( 0
) is negatively associated with division manager' s total pay.
H2:
Ceteris paribus, the extent of underallocation at the divisional level ( 0
) is not associated with division manager' s total pay.
We interpret the third and fourth implication as a problem of divergent preferences and that incentive mechanisms can potentially mitigate this problem. In particular, equity incentives for division managers can help to reduce inefficiencies of an internal capital market as they focus the attention also on the other division and not only ones own. Consequently, power struggles and lobbying for capital are reduced ( j r∆ decreases), since the division managers get penalized if they engage in such activities (cf. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) ). Furthermore, once equity incentives have retention effects for division managers, as proposed by Oyer (2004) , it becomes less likely that the retention constraint is binding and thus allocation increases and she is thus less likely to use the capital budget to respond to influence activities. As a result, equity incentives throughout the firm help to increase internal capital market efficiency by improving the quality of the internal allocations. This argument is summarized in the following hypothesis.
H3:
Firm-wide equity incentives are positively associated with the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocations (
).
Sample, Data, and Econometric Design
Sample and Data
The sample of firms for this study is gathered via the COMPUSTAT segment filings from the years 1998 until 2004. We start our sample period in fiscal year 1998 because this is the year in which SFAS 131 became effective. SFAS 131 basically requires firms to disclose disaggregated information in a way consistent with their internal organization. As such, outsiders can make assessments in a way consistent with insiders' assessments, which allows us to make use of segment disclosures to infer the inner workings of the firm.
We use a sampling procedure similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) and Billett and Mauer (2003) . Sampled firms are required to have at least two segments as well as two years of subsequent years of data. We exclude firms with segments in the financial sector. Further, We augment this dataset with manually collected data on company-wide stock option compensation plans using 10-k forms filed with the SEC. More specifically, we record details on the number of options outstanding per sample year and the change in outstanding options due to grants, exercises, and forfeitures. Further, we collect the average option price as disclosed in the 10-k forms. In the firm-level models, various missing data reduce the sample to 291 firms with 801 firm-year observations.
To investigate the substitution effect between division manager pay and division capital allocation, we match the segment data with the EXECUCOMP files, which provide details on the compensation of the firms' highest paid executives. Besides CEO, CFO and other corporate-level functions, the job title descriptions at times reveal these executives to be heading one of the firm' s divisions. Based on these job title descriptions and the firm' s division names, we are able to manually trace 691 division-years (370 division managers) to individual division manager compensation data in EXECUCOMP.
Econometric design
The design of our econometric analysis is composed of four steps, which we explain below. First, we discuss the benchmark model that we use to develop our proxy for excess capital allocation at the divisional level ( i I vs.
) and the quality of internal capital allocation at the firm level (
). Subsequently, we describe a model validating our proxy for the quality of internal capital allocation. We then describe the model used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, which links a division manager' s total pay to excess capital allocation. Finally, we present our model that tests hypothesis 3, which links equity incentives to the quality of internal capital allocation.
We first estimate a benchmark model to evaluate the transactions taking place within the internal capital markets of our sampled firms. Using insights from standard investment regressions based on q-theory, we specify a model that explains a division' s share of a fixed capital budget using variables that reflect the division' s relative size and investment opportunities. In particular, we use the following division-level model: CAPX ijt is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm j at time t, as reported in COMPUSTAT, and n the number of segments in firm j. NRDIV jt signifies the number of segments in firm j. As the number of segments increase, the allocation share of each individual segment will, all else equal, decrease by construction and we control for this effect. To adjust for the influence of differences in segment size, we include the relative size of the division (RELSIZE ij,t-1 ), with DIVASSETS ij being total identifiable segment assets. We adjust segment return on assets (ROA)
for the respective (two-digit) industry ROA (AROA ij,t-1 ). A segment with an ROA in excess of its concomitant industry level is expected to be allocated more internal funds and thus to invest more relative to other segments. The inverse holds for the impact of industry-adjusted ROA of the firm j' s all other segments, i.e., siblings: the higher the sibling ROA, the less investment should take place in segment i. To incorporate this effect, we include the average industry-adjusted sibling ROA (SIBLINGAROA kj,t-1 ).
HIGH_GO ij, t-1 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the segment has the highest growth opportunities (lowest book-to-market ratio) of all of a firm' s segments and equal to 0 otherwise.
We expect that segments with the highest growth opportunities receive a larger share of the capital budget to exploit these opportunities. To control for potential size effects in this relationship, we also include the interaction between HIGH_GO ij, t-1 and RELSIZE ij,t-1 . Since segments are not publicly traded, we impute the book-to-market ratio for each segment using a procedure similar to Billett and Mauer (2003) . In particular, we regress the book-to-market ratio on firm assets, return on assets, and sales-to-assets ratio for a sample of single-segment firms. We separately estimate this regression for every two-digit SIC code for every year. We then fit the book-to-market ratio of each segment in each year using that year' s estimated parameters for the industry of interest and the segment' s assets, return on assets, and sales-to-assets ratio.
For all variables other than NRDIV, we consider values from the preceding period, as allocation decisions are assumed to take place at the beginning of each year on the grounds of preceding end-of-period information. The benchmark model furthermore controls for intertemporal correlation by including the lagged segment share of the firm' s total capital expenditures. The model is specified to control for year and industry fixed effects and corrects for potential within-firm error term correlation.
We use the benchmark model to develop a number of proxies associated with the misallocation of capital that are in line with the theoretical model. First, we use the division-year specific residual ijt as a proxy for σ , i.e., the (lack of) quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation. We multiply this variable with -1 to make sure that higher values are associated with higher quality (ICA_QUALITY jt ).
Model 2: Validation
To validate the proxy for the quality of internal capital allocation identified in the benchmark model (ICA_QUALITY jt ), we examine the extent to which this proxy is related to a proxy for the efficiency of the internal capital market after the fact. We define the following firm- where ICM_EFF jt is based on the Billett and Mauer (2003) end-of-the year efficiency measure using industry-adjusted ROA and equals 1 if it is nonnegative (" efficient" ) and zero otherwise (" inefficient" ). We include several additional variables assumed to influence internal capital market efficiency: the number of segments NRDIV jt ; the degree of diversification, using the entropy measure described in Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1995) (DIVERSIFICATION jt ); the diversity in growth opportunities among segments (DIVERSBTM jt ), measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the imputed book-to-market ratios of a firm' s segments (cf. Rajan et al. (2000)); the firm' s book-to-market ratio (FIRMBTM jt ); firm size, measured as the log of the firm' s total assets (FIRMSIZE jt ); the importance of human capital (GO_EMPL jt ), measured as the firm' s growth opportunities per employee, i.e. the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (cf. Core and Guay (2001) ); and dichotomous variables for both year as well as type of industry. The model controls for potentially clustered errors at firm level.
Model 3: Hypotheses 1 and 2
We first specify a division-level model that investigates in how far excess capital allocations explain the overall level of the respective divisional manager' s total pay:
where LN_TOTALPAY ijt is the log of the individual segment manager' s total (take-home) pay; this pay includes salary, bonus, the total value of both restricted stock, as well as stock options granted using Black-Scholes (1973) 
The rent-seeking argument assumes that providing a rent-seeking manager with additional capital implies a reduction in the capital allocated to a non-rent-seeking manager. Given that the opportunity costs to rent-seek are too high for this latter manager, there is no need to compensate him for the loss in resources (underallocation). As a result, we expect that the substitution effect between capital and pay takes place with respect to the overallocation of capital, but not the underallocation of capital, i.e., 0 1 < a α and
Previous compensation research shows that the entity' s performance, size, growth opportunities, and importance of human capital have an influence on the total level of pay. We therefore incorporate variables representing segment size as measured by the segment' s ROA (ROA ijt ), the log of total segment assets SIZE ijt , imputed book-to-market ratio (BTM ijt ), and growth opportunities per employee (GO_EMPL jt ). Further, we control for year and industry effects as well as potentially clustered errors at the firm level.
Model 4: Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 states that equity incentives are positively associated with the quality of internal capital allocations. To test this hypothesis, we define the following firm-level empirical where ESOPINC jt measures all equity incentives (excluding the ones provided to the CEO) by computing the sensitivity of the firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price, as in Core and Guay (2001) . We also replace ESOPINC jt with ESOPINC_ALL jt , which additionally contains CEO stock option incentives, and report results separately. All other variables are defined above. We control for year and industry fixed-effects and correct for errors potentially clustered at the firm-level.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1-3 present selected summary statistics for divisional and firm level variables. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% level. Table 1 provides statistics for the entire sample of division-year observations (n=2,474). The sample divisions' size in assets (DIVASSETS) ranges from USD 6 million to 10.9 billion with a mean (median) of USD 1.1 billion (USD 407 million). The average division has a return on assets (ROA) and return on assets above industry average (AROA) of 15.7% and 6.8%, respectively. Table 2 displays division level statistics for the subset of division-year observations (n=691) that could be matched to individual compensation data. Average division CEO total pay amounts to USD 1.2 million annually (TOTALPAY), ranging from USD 218k to USD 6.3 million.
A cursory inspection of the key descriptive statistics in Table 1 and 2 reveals that the divisions in the subset are, on average, slightly larger and more profitable in terms of assets and return on assets, respectively, and receive a larger share of the capital budget. In a robustness check, we correct for a potential sample selection bias using a Heckman procedure (see section " 4.2.4.
Robustness checks and additional tests" for details).
The firm-level variables, presented in Table 3 , show that the number of divisions within the sampled firms ranges from 2 to 6 (NRDIV), with 3 divisions for the median firm. The measure for the ex-post efficiency of the internal capital market (ICM_EFF) shows that the average firm exhibits inefficiency, while the median firm does not exhibit inefficiency. The sample firms' size in assets (ASSETS) ranges from USD 13 million to 48.3 billion with a mean (median) of USD 3.6 billion (USD 1.4 billion). Further, the mean change in the logarithm of the value of options held by non-executives excluding (including) the CEO for a 1% change in stock prices (ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL) is 6.152 (6.388), i.e., an average change of USD 470k (USD 595k).
We present Pearson correlations among the independent variables of the division-level models in Table 4 and 5, and the correlations among the independent variables of the firm-level models in Table 6 . From a multicollinearity perspective, only the correlations between the equity incentive variables (ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL) and FIRMSIZE are relatively high.
Specification tests, however, show that the Variance Inflation Factors are mostly at or below 2.00 with a maximum of 4.97, which indicates that none of our empirical models are troubled by multicollinearity problems.
[Tables 1-6 about here] Table 7 presents the results of our benchmark model. The explanatory power of this benchmark model is very high (Adjusted R-square = 82.54%), which indicates that the allocation of internal capital is strongly associated with the variables of our model. In particular, internal capital allocation (CAPXSHARE t ) is significantly positively associated with lagged relative segment size (RELSIZE t-1 ), lagged segment industry-adjusted return on assets (AROA t-1 ), lagged highest growth opportunity interacted with lagged relative size (HIGH_GO t-1 *RELSIZE t-1 ), and lagged internal capital allocation (CAPXSHARE t-1 ). Internal capital allocation is significantly negatively associated with the number of divisions (NRDIV t ) and lagged sibling industry-adjusted return on assets (SIBLINGAROA t-1 ). All these findings are in line with our expectations.
Econometric analysis
Benchmark model and validation
Interestingly, the findings for AROA and SIBLINGAROA indicate that there is an almost perfect relative performance evaluation, in the sense that the impact of own division performance and sibling performance on capital allocation is symmetric (0.070, p<0.01; -0.075, p<0.01, respectively).
[ Table 7 about here] Before proceeding, we first test whether the assumption of the benchmark model that capital allocation is a linear function of the explanatory variables is empirically valid. For this purpose, we use the regression specification error test (RESET) proposed by Ramsey (1969) . The results of this test, whether based on the F-test or LM-test (see Wooldridge 2002) , cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the benchmark model is correctly specified. As a result, there is no evidence of functional form misspecification.
We use the firm-year specific standard deviation of the residual of the benchmark model as a proxy for the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation.
10 Table 8 presents the results of our validation test for this measure using a probit model. In Column 3 of Table 8 , the coefficient for ICA_QUALITY is positive and significant (p=0.010), which implies that the quality of internal capital allocation is positively associated with the probability that the internal capital market is 10 As indicated earlier, we multiply this measure by -1 to ensure that higher values are associated with higher quality. Table 8 reports the results for this analysis and shows that ICA_QUALITY remains positively associated with the probability that the internal capital market is efficient (p=0.010) and, more importantly, that STD_PRED is not associated with the probability of efficiency (p=0.695). This implies that, given our validation measure, we have adequately separated abnormal capital allocations from those based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities.
[ Table 8 about here] Table 9 presents the results of our model that links excess capital allocation at the divisional level to division manager' s total pay. The coefficient for the variable EXCESSCAPX is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01), which implies that there is a negative relationship between the division manager' s total pay and the excess allocation of capital. This finding is consistent with the argument that the allocation of internal capital acts as a substitute for increased take-home pay in compensating rent-seeking divisional managers. To specifically test hypotheses 1 and 2, we split excess capital allocation into overallocation (OVERALLOCATION) and underallocation (UNDERALLOCATION) of internal capital. The results of this analysis, also presented in Table 9 , reveal that overallocation is negative and highly significant (p<0.01), whereas underallocation is not significant (p=0.79). Given that the opportunity costs to rent-seek are too high for non-rent-seeking managers who receive less capital (underallocation), there is no need to compensate these managers for their loss in resources. Both the negative significant coefficient for overallocation and the insignificant coefficient for underallocation are consistent with this argument and provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypotheses 1 and 2
Regarding the control variables, we find in both models that division manager' s total pay (LN_TOTALPAY) is positively associated with the division' s level of performance (ROA), the size of the division managed (SIZE), the division' s growth opportunities (inverse of BTM), and the importance of human capital to the firm (GO_EMPL). All these results are consistent with our expectations.
[ Table 9 about here]
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 states that equity incentives for employees increase the quality of internal capital allocation. To test this hypothesis, we examine whether the incentives inherent in employee stock option plans are positively associated with our proxy for the quality of internal capital allocation. The results of this analysis, presented in Table 10 , show that stock option incentives for employees (ESOPINC) are significantly positively associated (p<0.05) with the quality of internal capital allocation (ICA_QUALITY). Including CEO options in employee stock option incentives (ESOPINC_ALL) yields similar results, showing a positive relationship with the quality of internal capital allocation (p<0.01). Hence, our results strongly support hypothesis 3. In particular, the more employees own options of their firm, the better the quality of internal capital allocation. Employee stock option plans thus help to align incentives of employees with firm objectives.
Regarding the control variables, we find that the quality of internal capital allocation is positively associated with the size of the firm (FIRMSIZE). Contrary to expectations, diversity in
divisions' growth opportunities (DIVERSBTM) i s p o s i ti v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e q u a l i ty of
internal capital allocation. We examine this unexpected finding further in the next section.
[ Table 10 about here]
Robustness checks and additional tests
Our benchmark model of the division' s share of firm capital expenditures includes the lag of the division' s share. Although this inclusion logically controls for a lagged effect, it also runs the risk of including division manager rents in the predicted value, if these rents are persistent.
That is, we potentially underestimate the extent of misallocation. To examine this potential effect,
we run the benchmark model after dropping lagged capital allocation. The explanatory power of the model is still very high (Adjusted R-square = 71.86%). Subsequently, we use the residuals of this model and re-run all models and tests discussed above. The results of these analyses show that the inferences drawn in this paper are robust to the exclusion of the lag effect in the benchmark model.
We further check the robustness of our results when we allow the coefficients of our benchmark model to either vary by year or vary by firm-level industry classification. In the latter case, data requirements reduce the total sample size of the benchmark model to 2,410 observations, while the number of observations available to test hypotheses 1 and 2 (3) reduces to 684 (775) observations. We also run our benchmark model allowing the intercept to be firm-specific using firm fixed effects. The results for using each of these three alternative specifications are quantitatively similar to those presented in the tables in this paper and thus do not change our inferences.
As a final robustness check related to the benchmark model, we test whether the predicted divisional shares of the capital budget aggregated at the firm-year level, i.e., In linking excess capital allocation at the divisional level to the compensation of divisional level managers, we can only include those division managers who are among the five highest paid executives included in EXECUCOMP. This potentially introduces a sample selection problem. To control for this problem, we run a Heckman sample selection model. In particular, we model the probability that the divisional manager is included in EXECUCOMP, where we use the number of divisions within a firm (lower probability) and the relative size of the division (higher probability) as instruments in the first stage to avoid multicollinearity problems in the second stage. Table 11 shows that, although the inverse Mills ratio is significant, the main findings presented in Table 9 are unaffected. Two noteworthy differences are the following. First, the coefficients for EXCESSCAPX and OVERALLOCATION both become smaller in an absolute sense, but they remain highly significant and keep pointing in the expected direction. Second, the coefficients for ROA and BTM become larger in an absolute sense and the coefficient for BTM also becomes more significant. Overall, our results related to hypotheses 1 and 2 are robust to potential sample selection problems.
[ Table 11 about here]
Another potential problem, more precisely an endogeneity concern, arises in examining the impact of equity incentives on the quality of internal allocations. Although this concern is valid, the most likely bias that would be introduced is a bias that works against finding the results presented in Table 10 (see also Stein (2003) ). For example, reversed causality implies a negative association between equity incentives and the quality of internal capital allocation. This is a direction opposite to that hypothesized and thus most likely works against finding our expected result. Despite this, we run a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis using four instruments based on the findings from Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., idiosyncratic risk, R&D to sales, number of employees, and a firm' s book-to-market ratio. The first-stage exclusion restriction test, partial R-square, and the overidentifying restrictions test indicate that these instruments satisfy the relevance and exogeneity criterion.
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The results of the 2SLS analysis, presented in Table 12 , show that equity incentives have a significant positive effect on the quality of internal allocations, consistent with the inferences drawn based on Table 10 . Also consistent with the most likely endogeneity story, the 2SLS coefficient and Hausman test indicate that the bias introduced is significant and works against finding the result presented in Table 10 . More specifically, the 2SLS coefficient for ESOPINC is more than 3 times larger than the OLS coefficient and is also more significant. As a result, the data continue to support hypothesis 3.
[ Table 12 about here]
In addition to changes in the coefficient for ESOPINC, there are also changes in the coefficients and significance levels for FIRMSIZE and GO_EMPL. In contrast to the positive and significant coefficient for FIRMSIZE in the OLS model, FIRMSIZE is no longer significant in the 2SLS model. Further, the coefficient for GO_EMPL remains negative in the 2SLS model, but is larger in magnitude in an absolute sense and now also statistically significant.
Finally, contrary to expectations, we find in both the OLS model and 2SLS model that the quality of internal capital allocation is positively associated with the diversity in divisions' growth opportunities. A potential explanation for this result might be that it is important to rank divisions on a relative basis when allocating a fixed capital budget. Stein (1997) argues that the quality of the ranking of projects depends on the extent of diversification, where a focused strategy, i.e., less diversification, increases this quality. However, to be able to make such a ranking, some diversity in growth opportunities is needed. Thus, although diversity in growth opportunities creates incentives to rent-seek, it also allows a ranking of projects, the benefits of which are higher the lower the level of diversification. To examine whether there is an interaction between the diversity in growth opportunities and diversification on the quality of internal capital allocation, we re-run equation (4) after including this interaction.
The results, shown in Table 13 , indicate that the main effect for the diversity in growth opportunities (DIVERSBTM) is significantly positive, while the interaction effect is significantly negative. To examine the implication of this, we use the estimates from model (1) in Table 13 to determine the partial derivative of ICA_QUALITY to DIVERSBTM:
This partial derivative reflects the impact of diversity in growth opportunities on the quality of a firm' s internal capital allocation as a function of diversification. It shows that, in the presence of a focused strategy (DIVERSIFICATION = 0), the partial derivative is positive (0.099) and more diversity in growth opportunities is thus beneficial in terms of a higher quality of internal capital allocation. The negative coefficient on DIVERSIFICATION in equation (12) indicates that this effect diminishes and eventually reverses. In parti cular, the coefficients predi ct that, at the average level of diversification observed in the sample, i.e., DIVERSIFICATION = 0.384, the partial derivative equals 0.046, which is close to the coefficient for DIVERSBTM reported in Table 10 . Further, at higher levels of DIVERSIFICATION, i.e., values that range from approximately 0.713 to the maximum of 1.340, the partial derivative is negative and more diversity in growth opportunities is detrimental in terms of a lower quality of internal capital allocation. In sum, the unexpected result observed in the main analysis can be explained by the fact that there exists an interaction between the level of diversification within the firm and the diversity in divisions' growth opportunities.
[ Table 13 about here]
Discussion and Conclusion
A large stream of literature compares internal capital markets with external capital markets to assess efficiencies. The peculiarity of internal capital markets is that capital allocations might not only be driven by performance criteria and growth opportunities, but also by the way divisional and executive managers are compensated, an aspect that is still scarcely considered in the empirical literature. In this paper, we examine to what extent firms' resource allocation decisions are affected by the CEOs' response to division-managers' rent-seeking activities and whether equity incentives mitigate this problem.
The results of this study show that compensation and incentives do play an important role in the allocation process of internal capital. Internal capital that is allocated in excess of a benchmark serves as a substitute for increased take-home pay in the overall compensation package of rent-seeking divisional managers. When a capital budget is used to pay rents, less capital is available in other divisions for promising and value-adding investments, which potentially harms firm value. In line with this argument, our results show that misallocations are associated with ex-post inefficiencies.
Further, paying rents indicates that the firm suffers from a two-layer agency problem, i.e., not only divisional managers but also the CEO act opportunistically and create agency costs.
Whereas this is a major problem for many (multi-divisional) firms, our results show that stock options help to align the incentives of divisional managers, the CEO, and the firm. Providing divisional managers and the CEO with equity incentives via ESOPs penalizes rent-seeking activities and rent payments, while value-adding activities and decisions are rewarded.
These findings have direct implications for the management of diversified firms. A conventional controllability argument is that, in the absence of interdependencies, firms should base compensation of division managers solely on the performance of their respective organizational unit. Such a contract, however, does not prevent divisional rent-seeking. We show that even or maybe especially in the absence of interdependencies in multi-divisional firms, firmwide incentives are a necessary tool to prevent the capital budget being used to compensate rentseeking managers. Designing compensation contracts beyond standard controllability considerations to include firm-level performance, for example using ESOPs, improves the quality of internal capital allocations and thus investment efficiency.
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, even though we take great care in developing and validating our benchmark model, and in testing the robustness of the results associated with this model, we cannot rule out that other factors play a role in capital expenditure decisions. Second, we use publicly available disclosures to observe internal capital markets. The reporting environment under SFAS 131, which is part of our study, is a significant improvement over SFAS 14, but we still have to rely on circumstantial indicators that point to the existence of and behavior in internal capital markets. Third, we impute growth opportunities of non-listed segments using comparable single-segment listed firms, which is -despite being a widely applied technique -subject to considerable subjectivity.
Despite the above limitations, our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First,
by showing that the capital budget acts as a substitute for increased take-home pay of divisional managers, we provide empirical evidence that a two-layer agency problem exists and plays a major role in inefficiencies in internal capital markets. Second, our research design makes a direct link between the use of employee stock option incentives and the quality of internal capital allocations. We provide strong support for the argument that broad-based equity plans mitigate the problem of misallocation and show that ESOPs are used to align the interests of employees with those of the firm. Related to this point, our results indicate that the benefits of firm-level incentives, i.e., measures at a higher level of aggregation than the own division, can be high even when there are few operational interdependencies between divisions. Finally, our study adds to the discussion in the literature whether stock option plans are incentive relevant only for executives or for employees in general. Our findings show that ESOPs do provide important incentives in internal capital markets. ROA is the segment' s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. AROA is the segment' s return on assets less the segment' s respective (two-digit) industry return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. BTM is the segment' s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of single-segment firms with corresponding two-digit SIC codes. This table reports descriptive statistics on the subset of divisions across all sampled firms that could be matched to individual compensation data of the responsible division manager. This matching procedure led to a sub-sample of n=691 of the entire division-year sample of n=2,474. Divisions are business segments as disclosed according to SFAS No. 131. TOTALPAY is the segment manager' s total pay, comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) value, long-term incentive payouts, and any other compensation item, e.g. pension contributions. LN_TOTALPAY is the natural logarithm of TOTALPAY. DIVASSETS are total identifiable segment assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of DIVASSETS. ROA is the segment' s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. AROA is the segment' s return on assets less the segment' s respective (two-digit) industry return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. BTM is the segment' s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of single-segment firms with corresponding two-digit SIC codes. This table reports descriptive statistics on the firm-level observations (n=801). ICM_EFF is the ex-post internal capital market efficiency measure developed by Billett and Mauer (2003.) ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) , capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMBTM is the firm' s book-to-market ratio. ASSETS are the firm' s total assets. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of ASSETS. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees. . NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. RELSIZE is the division' s total identifiable assets divided by total firm assets. AROA is the segment' s return on assets less the segment' s respective (two-digit) industry return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. HIGH_GO is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the division with the lowest imputed book-to-market ratio (highest growth opportunities) within the firm, and 0 otherwise. Statistical significance is highlighted with *** (α<0.01), ** (α<0.05), and * (α<0.1). ROA is the segment' s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total identifiable segment assets. BTM is the segment' s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of single-segment firms with corresponding two-digit SIC codes. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees. Statistical significance is highlighted with *** (α<0.01), ** (α<0.05), and * (α<0.1). Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) , capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMBTM is the firm' s book-to-market ratio. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm' s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees. Statistical significance is highlighted with *** (α<0.01), ** (α<0.05), and * (α<0.1). This table reports the regression results from estimating the benchmark model of internal capital allocation using 2,474 division-year observations. Divisions are business segments as disclosed according to SFAS No. 131. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. The dependent variable is the division' s share of capital expenditures in total firm capital expenditures, CAPXSHARE. Several determinants are specified to explain this share. NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. RELSIZE is the division' s total identifiable assets divided by total firm assets. AROA is the segment' s return on assets less the segment' s respective (two-digit) industry return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. HIGH_GO is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the division with the lowest imputed book-to-market ratio (highest growth opportunities) within the firm, and 0 otherwise. P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticityrobust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). This table reports the results from the estimation of the model used to validate the measure of internal capital allocation quality. It links internal capital allocation quality with the ex-post internal capital market efficiency measure developed by Billett and Mauer (2003) . ICM_EFF is a binary variable equal to 1 for nonnegative values of the Biller and Mauer measure (efficient) and 0 otherwise (inefficient). Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included, but not separately reported. Internal capital allocation quality is captured by ICA_QUALITY; it is measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. STD_PRED is measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the predicted values of a benchmark model. NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) , capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMBTM is the firm' s book-to-market ratio. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm' s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). This table provides the estimates from a model examining the substitution effect between capital allocation and division manager total compensation. The model is applied to 691 observations of a full sample of 2,474 divisionyears that could be matched to data on division manager compensation. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. LN_TOTALPAY is the natural logarithm of the segment manager' s total pay, comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) ROA is the segment' s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total identifiable segment assets. BTM is the segment' s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of singlesegment firms with corresponding two-digit SIC codes. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). This table provides the estimates from a model examining the impact of stock option incentives on the quality of internal capital allocation using 801 firm-level observations. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those allocations based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. Model 1 and Model 2 differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, respectively. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) , capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm' s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). This table provides the estimates from a model examining the substitution effect between capital allocation and division manager total compensation after controlling for potential sample selection problems using a Heckman procedure. In the first stage of this procedure, we include the number of divisions in the firm and the relative size of the division as instruments and these variables are individually and jointly significant. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. LN_TOTALPAY is the natural logarithm of the segment manager' s total pay, comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) value, long-term incentive payouts, and any other compensation item, e.g. pension contributions. EXCESSCAPX represents excess capital allocations, i.e. is the residual of a benchmark capital allocation model. EXCESSCAPX is used as a determinant in Model 1. In Model 2, EXCESSCAPX is replaced by OVERALLOCATION and UNDERALLOCATION, where OVERALLOCATION ( UNDERALLOCATION) equals EXCESSCAPX (-1*EXCESSCAPX) if EXCESSCAPX is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. ROA is the segment' s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total identifiable segment assets. BTM is the segment' s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of single-segment firms with corresponding two-digit SIC codes. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). λ is the Inverse Mills Ratio. P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, twotailed otherwise). This table provides the 2SLS estimates from a model examining the impact of stock option incentives on the quality of internal capital allocation using 797 firm-level observations. In the first stage, we use idiosyncratic risk, R&D to sales, number of employees, and a firm' s book-to-market ratio as instruments for stock option incentives. The firststage exclusion restriction test, partial R-square, and the overidentifying restrictions test indicate that these instruments satisfy the relevance and exogeneity criterion. The Hausman test indicates significant endogeneity of stock option incentives in the second stage (p<0.05 two-tailed). Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those allocations based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. Model 1 and Model 2 differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, respectively. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) , capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm' s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). This table provides the estimates from a model examining the impact of the interaction between diversification and the diversity in growth opportunities on the quality of internal capital allocation using 801 firm-level observations. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the firm-year specific standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those allocations based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. Model 1 and Model 2 differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, respectively. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001) , i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. DIVERSIFICATION i s t he e nt ro p y m e a s u re a s i n B u s hm a n , Indjejikian, and Smith (1995), capturing the firm' s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm' s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments' imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm' s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm' s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firmclustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise).
